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1. Introduction 
The purpose of the Development Policy Evaluation Model (DEVPEM) is to provide an appropriate 
modelling structure for analysing the welfare and distributional implications of alternative agricultural 
policies in developing countries. The aim of the model is to provide illustrative results that show how 
structural diversity among developing countries, and systemic differences from developed OECD 
countries, can affect the outcomes of alternative policy interventions. The model is relatively stylised, 
seeking  to capture, as simply as possible, four critical aspects of rural economies in developing countries 
that are important when evaluating the impacts of agricultural and trade policies. These are:  
 
(1).   The role of the household as both a producer and a consumer of food crops.  
(2).   High transaction costs of participating in markets, resulting in a subsistence sector that often 
is important in terms of the number of households and the amount of food production it 
encompasses. 
(3).   Market linkages that can transmit impacts of policy and market shocks among heterogeneous 
rural producers and consumers, particularly via factor markets (for labour, land or capital, when 
those markets exist).  
(4). The imperfect convertibility of land from one use to another.  
   
OECD already has a model – the Policy Evaluation Model (PEM) – that is used to examine the effects of 
agricultural policies in member countries. PEM captures some of the market linkages referred to above (3), 
and a major strength lies in its treatment of land use (4). However, it contains no explicit recognition of (1) 
and (2). In building upon the PEM to account for these features, the aims of DEVPEM are to account for 
some of the systemic differences that are important in developing countries and to show how these 
differences can affect the results of specific policy interventions. As with PEM, the results of DEVPEM 
should be seen as illustrative of potential outcomes rather than predictive.  
 
A detailed motivation for the modelling approach and a justification for focusing on the above 
features in a developing country context are provided in Brooks, Dyer and Taylor (2008). The model takes 
as its unit of analysis the agricultural household, as in the seminal work of Singh  et  al. (1986). This 
“building block” makes it possible to capture (1) and (2) above, the latter by having household farms 
confront a “price band,” defined by the market price plus (minus) the per-unit costs of transacting in 
consumption (output) markets, as in Strauss (1986) and de Janvry et al. (1991). Heterogeneous households 
are then embedded in a rural economy-wide structure in order to capture (3), as in Taylor et al. (2005). The 
specific modelling of land allocation adopted in the PEM is retained in order to address (4), with a constant 
elasticity of transformation function capturing the imperfect convertibility of land between agricultural and 
  1 livestock activities (OECD, 2005). The model is static, which means that it can be used to analyse the short 
to medium term impact of policy interventions on economic welfare and related indicators, such as 
incomes, poverty and inequality. However, there are no dynamics, so the longer run implications for 
growth and development cannot be gauged using this model. 
A prototype model is presented for one country (Malawi), together with some preliminary policy 
simulation results. The aim is to develop six country models in total, with two countries from Africa 
(Ghana and Malawi); two from Asia (Indonesia and Vietnam); and two from Latin America (Guatemala 
and Nicaragua). The choice of countries is tentative and has been driven by two main considerations: first 
the need to reflect structural differences across countries and regions, and second the availability of 
harmonised and comparable household level data.      The basic data input for DEVPEM is a disaggregated 
social accounting matrix (SAM) with individual accounts for each rural household group in the model, as 
well as household-specific activity accounts. The SAM is constructed with data from the United Nations 
Food and Agricultural Organisation’s Rural Income Generation Activities (RIGA) database, which 
processes and harmonises national survey data, together with data from the FAOSTAT database. Indeed, 
DEVPEM has been designed explicitly to exploit the harmonised household level data that are available in 
the RIGA datasets.  
 
Section 2 presents the model in its most general form. We begin in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 by assuming an 
environment of well functioning markets, as in the PEM. This is useful in illuminating the key differences 
between the firm-based PEM and the household-based DEVPEM when markets work well. In Section 2.3, 
we introduce transaction costs, which reflect market imperfections and result in some prices, for some 
household groups, diverging from market prices. Section 2.4 presents a simple estimable version of the 
model, which can be solved analytically.  We also describe the structure of the SAM that will constitute the 
data input for DEVPEM. Section 3 describes the calibration of parameters in the consumption, production, 
and land supply functions, as well as the estimation of transaction costs. In Section 4, we describe a first 
prototype of the DEVPEM, with an application for Malawi. Simulations of price changes and input 
subsidies are discussed. Section 5 concludes the modelling exercise and discusses the next steps in the 
project. 
 
2. The theoretical foundation of the DEVPEM 
Here, we present the model without making assumptions on the specific functional forms. We first present 
the benchmark agricultural household model, in the spirit of Singh, et al. (1986). We then explain how 
imperfect land supply and transactions costs can be added to such a model.  
2.1. Benchmark model with perfect markets 
We assume an economy portrayed by a single representative household. There are N items in the economy, 
which for the household can be consumption goods, factors of production, or both (as in the case of 
household time endowment and the labour/leisure choice). Though in practice many items will either only 
be consumed, only be produced, or only used as factors, we keep a general notation for all items.  
The household derives utility from consumption (C) of items i ( { } 1,.., iI N ∈= ). Consumption is zero for 
oods which cannot be consumed (such as land, for example, or fertilizer). Maximum utility is given by:   g
  { }
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C
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where  C is the (1 × N) vector of goods and factors. The household has initial endowments 
E = {Ei, i=1,..,N}, each of which can be used in farm production, marketed, or consumed, as in the case of 
leisure. Farm production involves the use of factor endowments and product-specific intermediate inputs. 
Let  be the quantity of item k used in the production of item i (superscript f indicates the 
factor is used on the farm), so that the production of good i depends on the (1 x N) vector  of inputs: 
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i Q as the quantity sold. The market balance 
for each item requires that the sum of endowments and total quantities produced or bought equals the sum 
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Prices for goods and wage rates for factors are all given by the (N × 1) price vector p. As long as all 
markets work seamlessly and are connected with the rest of the world, all prices are market prices, 
exogenous to the household economy. As a producer, the household, as the pure agricultural firm in the 
PEM (OECD, 2005), takes market prices as given and makes production decisions to maximize profit. 
Maximum profit (π*) from production of each farm good i is given by: 
  ()









The household is constrained in its consumption by its farm profits and incomes from marketed factors of 
production. The cash constraint is expressed as:  
 










Using equation (3), which we multiply by pi and sum over i ; then using equations 4 and 5 we can write the 
“full income” constraint as: 
 
   (6) 
* pC = π +p E
 
In other words, the total value of goods consumed (from own production or purchased) evaluated at market 
prices is equal to the sum of all profits and the total market value of all endowments (also called “full 
income”). This is similar to the treatment of income in the agricultural household models of Singh, et al. 
(1986) and others, in which markets are assumed to work efficiently and the prices households face are 
determined in those markets.  
 
Despite the dual nature of the household as a producer-consumer, as long as all prices are exogenous the 
household solves the consumer problem and the producer problem independently (Löfgren and Robinson, 
1999; Singh, et al., 1986; Taylor and Adelman, 2003). The household can be pictured as first maximizing 
its total income as a producer, given prices of inputs and outputs, and then using that income to maximize 
its utility, given prices of consumption goods. The profit maximization problem gives the farm output 
supply functions, 
  3  
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where p denotes the exogenous vector of prices of all inputs. This solution determines the profit π* and 
thus the full income y
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For each good, the surplus Q*–C* determines whether the household is a seller (positive surplus) or buyer 
(negative surplus) of the good. The same idea applies for supply and demand of factors of production. 
 
In a highly commercialized agricultural economy, the consumption decisions of agricultural households 
have little or no impact on production or on the amount of production that enters the market. Thus it is not 
unreasonable to ignore them and treat agricultural production as coming from agricultural firms, as is done 
in the PEM. When dealing with less developed agricultural economies, however, ignoring the consumption 
side may seriously undermine a model’s predictive power. In a context where rural households consume a 
large part of their agricultural output, an increase in prices has two effects: on the producer side, the 
household reacts as a firm and increases output; on the consumer side, the standard ambiguity between 
income effects and substitution effects holds. The final consumption and production decisions can differ 
widely from those predicted by an agricultural firm model. For example, an increase in the price of an 
agricultural commodity may lead to an increase in production almost fully absorbed by a similar increase 
in consumption: the marketed surplus effect predicted by an agricultural firm model would, in that case, be 
significantly overstated (Singh, et al., 1986). 
 
DEVPEM integrates several household models into a general equilibrium framework. Accounting for 
interactions among households with different asset holdings, production technologies and consumption 
patterns makes it possible to uncover complex responses to market shocks and heterogeneous welfare 
outcomes. When the agricultural economy consists of widely different actors (e.g., large commercial farms, 
commercial smallholders and subsistence producers) unexpected outcomes can occur through the interplay 
of labour, land and other markets. Such can be the case when smallholders depend on commercial farms 
for a significant part of their income, and commercial farms rely on labour supplied by smallholders (Dyer, 
et al., 2006). 
 
This focus on heterogeneous households brought together within a general equilibrium model is the most 
radical difference between DEVPEM and PEM. There are, however, other differences as well as 
similarities between the two approaches. One important similarity is the treatment of land markets, which 
is a key feature of the PEM adopted into the DEVPEM.  
 
2.2. Imperfect land transferability 
The model just described assumes that all markets work perfectly. Many agricultural household models, 
however, assume that land is a fixed input in each production activity. That is, 
f f
iT iT QQ =  for all production 
activities i (T being the subscript for land). This assumption may be appropriate in the very short run, but it 
does not permit land to be reallocated across activities, as is likely to occur in response to policy changes. 
If a household’s total land endowment is given but this land is perfectly transferable from one use to 
another, the activity-specific land constraints (
f f
iT iT QQ = ) are replaced by a total household land 
endowment constraint,  
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which is a special case of the market balance stated in equation (3), with purchased, sold, produced and 
consumed quantities of land all constrained to zero.  
 
The PEM recognizes that land may be transformable from one use to another, albeit imperfectly. Imperfect 
transformability of land among uses can be represented by replacing equation (9) with a continuous and 
convex land supply function S replacing the linear constraint on land:  
 




The difference between the linear and non-linear forms is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
It can be shown that under those additional constraints, the optimal amount of land supplied to the 























Equation (11) expresses that the ratio of marginal value products of land in different uses must be equal to 
the marginal rate of transformation of land from one use to the other. Note that when S is a simple 
summation function (as in equation (9)), this optimality condition reduces to the well-known equalization 
of marginal value products condition.  
 
 
 Figure 1: Linear versus non-linear land supply. In the non-linear case, the maximum amount of land available 
for activity A and for activity B may differ.  
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TA + TB = ET 
S(TA,TB) = ET 
TA, land allocated to activity A 
TB, Land allocated to activity B 
 
2.3. Accounting for transaction costs 
The treatment of market transaction costs is a key aspect in which DEVPEM differs from PEM (and from 
most general equilibrium models). DEVPEM explicitly models the effects of transaction costs and 
endogenous market participation. 
 
In section 2.1 we described the household as making production and consumption decisions independently. 
This separability property of the utility- and profit-maximization problems relies on the assumption that all 
prices are exogenous to the household. As soon as the subjective value that the household places on a good 
(i.e. the “shadow price”) deviates from the market price, separability no longer holds. If a household lacks 
access to a market, or if it faces transaction costs so high that it withdraws from the market (the case of a 
subsistence producer), the shadow price is determined by the intersection of the household’s internal 
demand and supply functions.  
 
Under what circumstances will the household choose autarky over market participation for a certain good? 
This generally is not an important question for developed countries (such as those modelled in the six 
country PEM), where most agricultural households do not consume a significant share of their own 
production. In developing countries, however, large distances and a lack of infrastructure can result in non-
competitive market structures, imperfect information, and high costs of transportation, all of which can 
create an environment in which transaction costs are high and many households live in partial or total 
autarky.  
 
The DEVPEM model assumes that the household faces an (N × 1) vector of unit transaction costs t
b as 
buyers of consumption goods or production factors. As producers, they face an (N × 1) vector t
s of 
transaction costs for selling their goods or tradable factors.  
 







i (i = 1,2, …, N; superscript m added to prices to indicate the exogenous market price). This reduces 
the consumption possibilities of the household for these items. Faced with transactions costs in output 
  6 markets, the producing household perceives a wedge between market and farm gate price, such that the 






i. A household’s decision price thus depends on its trading status 
for the particular good or factor. In particular, the decision price for good i is given by: 
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where   denotes the household’s internal shadow price. When the household neither buys nor sells, the 
shadow price is disconnected from the market price and is determined by the intersection of household 
supply and demand. Because the decision price is endogenous (though constrained within exogenous 
bounds), consumption and production decisions are inseparable from one another.  
p %
 
Aside from the price determination equation (12), transaction costs do not impose any additional 
restrictions on the model described by equations (1) through (6). Full income (equation (6)) can simply be 
re-labelled as “shadow income,” since the decision price vector p is now a vector of shadow prices rather 
than market prices. Market participation for item i is determined by comparing the utility obtained from 
selling, buying, and remaining self-sufficient for that item (Key, et al., 2000). Key et al. note that whereas 
the determination of market participation for a good “may become quite cumbersome when there are 
several commodities that can be either purchased or sold, the principle can be shown with a simplified 
model in which there is choice of regime for only one commodity which is produced and consumed by the 
household (e.g., a food crop)” (p. 248).  
 
Let V(p, y) denote the indirect utility of this commodity, where p is the decision price and y is household 
income. The utility levels to compare are: 
 
   (13) 
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The lowest market price, 
m p , at which the household is willing to sell the good, satisfies: 
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Similarly, the highest market price, 
m p , at which the household is willing to buy, satisfies: 
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  7 Figure 2 depicts these prices. At a market price higher than the seller price threshold 
m p , the household 
obtains a higher utility by being a seller than by being autarkic, shown by segment CD on the indirect 
utility curve V
s. At a market price lower than the buyer price threshold
m p , the household is better off as a 
buyer than being autarkic, shown by segment AB on the indirect utility curve V
b. For all market prices 
between the buyer price and the seller price thresholds the household is better off being autarkic, as shown 
by segment BC on curve V
a. The width of the “price band” – i.e., the interval of market prices in which the 
household is better off being autarkic in the good – equals the sum of seller and buyer transactions costs: 
 
 
mm s b p pt t −= +  (16) 
 
It is worth noting that while this explicit accounting for the role of transaction costs may capture an 
important aspect of developing country agriculture, additional constraints in input markets (e.g., fixed 
rather than proportional transaction costs, or seasonal cash or credit constraints) may impede the ability of 
households to respond to higher prices, even when the difference between the market price and shadow 
price exceeds transaction costs in the output market. One possibility is to modify the standard model to 
accommodate such features; a more practical option is to impose additional constraints on the model and 
























  8 2.4. Specification of functional forms 
This section combines the three features discussed above in a model of a single-household rural economy 
with transactions costs and a sluggish land supply. Here, we specify functional forms and derive first order 
conditions, in order to illustrate the solvability of the model we described in the previous section.  
 
For simplicity, we treat all tradable goods and factors equally, land T being the only exception, as it cannot 
be purchased or sold (although it can be transformed imperfectly from one use to another). Let us denote 
the set of tradable items  {1,.., 1} IN





Household welfare is described by a Linear Expenditure System (LES). This builds on a Stone-Geary 
utility function and assumes that there are minimum quantities below which consumption cannot fall. It is 
the most frequently used system in empirical estimation of demand (Sadoulet and De Janvry, 1995). 
Parameters are zero for goods that are not being consumed, guaranteeing that their level of consumption 
will be zero in the solution. For goods consumed, ci  represents the incompressible (subsistence) 
consumption levels. 
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with known parameters bik and β. 
 
 
c) Market Constraints 
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As in the PEM, a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) land supply function shapes the allocation of 
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  9 where the parameters αT, ρ the η are all known. For simplicity, we can write  () iT a
ρ
i γ η = × and reduce the 
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In addition, we constrain exchanged quantities to be positive: 
 





d) Cash constraint 
 
Provided that land is the only factor for which there is no market, there exists an ((N-1) x 1) vector of 
market prices p
m. If households face transaction cost vectors t
s and t
b  for selling and buying goods, 
respectively, then the cash constraint is: 
 















3. Calibration of the model 
The model presented above consists of a set of variables (for which we have observations) and a set of 
relationships among variables, defined by equations with parameters (for most of which we do not have 
observations). In order to make the model operational and tractable, we must calibrate it (find missing 
parameter values) using actual production and consumption data. The central aim of calibration procedures 
is to find parameter values such that the observed data represent a solution to the model. In other words, 
calibration consists of plugging in the observed variable values into the equations of our model to “reverse-
compute” the parameter values which would have led to those observed variable values as the equilibrium 
solution. It is, in a sense, the mirror operation to simulations, which rely on the fixed parameter values to 
estimate the values of variables.  
 
Our calibration procedure is based on a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM).
1 Computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) practitioners often parameterize models using SAMs because they offer a convenient 
framework and a simple way to use secondary data. A SAM provides a picture of all flows of money and 
goods in an economy in matrix form, where rows represent the incomes of economic actors and columns 
represent expenditures, such that row and column totals must be equal. Thus, one advantage of using a 
SAM is that, by construction, all cash constraints and market clearing conditions are satisfied for all 
accounts in the matrix. The SAM thus provides a data framework consistent with general equilibrium 
theory.  
 
Table 1 provides the general structure of the SAM used to calibrate the DEVPEM model. The cells 
indicate which variable of DEVPEM can be read from which part of the table. The SAM is a matrix of 
 
1 See Pyatt (1988) for the SAM approach to modelling, and Keuning and Ruijter (1988) for how to construct a SAM. 
  10 values rather than quantities, but without loss of generality one can set all initial prices and rents to unity, 
thus implicitly converting the matrix into money-metric quantity units. Prices and rents are determined by 
this assumption, such that all other variables of the model appear in the SAM: quantities produced, 
consumed, used as factors, imported and exported. Sums along rows or columns provide us with total 
incomes and expenditures, total supplies and demands, all of which match to make markets clear.  
 
Table 1: General structure of a SAM used to calibrate the DEVPEM model 
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3.1. Calibration of the consumption function 
In models which use the simplest functional forms (such as the Leontiev or Cobb-Douglas forms), the 
SAM provides all the information needed to find all the parameters. This, however, is not the case with the 
linear expenditure system. The utility function assumed in (17) features 2(N-1) parameters: 
“incompressible consumption” ci for each good and the α exponents. The former will need to be 
determined from LSMS data, for example using consumption values for the poorest households, or using 
econometric estimation techniques. We then plug in the values from the SAM into the consumption 
demand equation with prices set to unity and obtain:  
















The consumption side of the model is calibrated in this way.  
 
3.2. Calibration of the production function 
The calibration of CES production functions also requires that some external data be used. The production 
function assumed in (18) features N+1 parameters: bik for all k and β. Since we only have N observations 
on input values in the data, we cannot estimate this function without additional data on one of those 












This parameter can be estimated using various forms of log-linear regressions of value added on factor 
inputs and costs (McFadden, 1978), but in practice it is often borrowed from other studies because the data 
for direct estimation usually are lacking. Once β is known, calibrating the bik shares is relatively 
straightforward. Since we scale all prices to be equal to one, the optimality condition for factor input ratios 



















(The subscript 0 signifies that this relationship is only true in the calibration data.). We can then substitute 
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where the last equality follows from the fact that, in the calibration data, the sum of factor values is equal 
to the production value. This completes our calibration requirements for the CES production function.  
 
                                                      
2 See Sancho (2007) and Rutherford (2002) for CES function calibration techniques. 
  12 3.3. Calibration of the land supply function 
C a l i b r a t i o n  o f  C E T  p a r a m e t e r s  m i r r o r s  C E S  c a l i b r a t i o n .  A s  w e  c o unt  the  parameters  to  estimate  in 
equation (21), there are N parameters to estimate but only have (N–1) observations from which to estimate 











This parameter is not usually estimated directly. Instead, we use the existing relationship between σ, the 
own-price elasticity of land supply εii, and the share of land in a crop si:
3 
  
  (1 ) ii i s ε σ =−  
 
Obtaining our parameter of interest thus depends on the availability of εii which, again, is often borrowed 
from exiting literature, as it is in the PEM model (OECD, 2005). Once σ is estimated and ρ inferred, the γi 

















3.4. Estimating transaction costs 
This issue relates to a rather small body of literature, namely, the estimation of transaction costs for 
developing rural economies.
  4 Two published articles address this issue. The first is by Renkow 
et  al.  (2004), who work with Kenyan data. Using maximum likelihood estimation they find that “on 
average the ad valorem tax equivalent of the fixed transactions costs in the sample is 15.5%.” The second 
attempt is made by Cadot et al. (2006), who use Malagasy data and define transaction costs as the revenues 
foregone due to non-participation in markets. They use switching regression estimates to calculate “the 
opportunity cost of not switching” for the “marginal” farmer, and evaluate this cost at a surprisingly high 
level: “more than one year of the typical subsistence farmer's output valued at market prices.” 
 
Lacking authoritative data on transaction costs, a combination of rough estimation (e.g., using RIGA data, 
if possible) and sensitivity analysis may be required. The specific estimation method will depend on the 
available data for each country to which DEVPEM is applied.  
 
 
4. Prototype model for Malawi 
This section presents an application of the model to the case of Malawi. Malawi is the first of six countries 
for which the DEVPEM model will be used in policy simulation exercises, the other countries being 
(provisionally) Ghana, Indonesia, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Vietnam. Malawi and Ghana are 
distinguished from the other countries in terms of their considerably lower per-capita income and their high 
                                                      
3 This relationship becomes more complex in case of 2-level or 3-level CET functions, which is used in the PEM. 
4 The empirical literature on transactions costs in staple markets of developing countries is rather limited; it is 
reviewed in Barrett (2008). 
  13 share of agriculture in GDP. Malawi also differs from the other countries  by virtue of the high share of its 
population still living in rural areas (88% in our sample). Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the 
world, with households often struggling to meet their immediate consumption needs and confronting either 
prohibitive transaction costs, or missing markets, for outputs and inputs. It thus represents the polar 
opposite of the PEM model for developed countries, which can ignore the consumption side of farmers’ 
decisions and can assume that markets function seamlessly without prohibitive transaction costs. A further 
benefit of selecting Malawi as a prototype is the availability of earlier work on the country undertaken for 
OECD by Professor Andrew Dorward and others (see OECD, 2005). This makes it possible to compare the 
insights available from the stylised DEVPEM, which seeks to be flexible enough for application across a 
range of countries, with those obtainable from a more elaborate yet country-specific model. The aim is to 
ensure that the most important structural features of the economy are represented in DEVPEM and that no 
crucial determinant of policy impacts is overlooked. 
 
Our main data source for the model application is the 2004 Malawi Integrated Household Survey. The 
survey data have been processed by the RIGA team at FAO, which has greatly facilitated the construction 
of the variables needed for the model (Carletto, et al., 2007). FAOSTAT is used as a complementary data 
source for information on aggregate production and consumption of agricultural goods.  
 
 
4.1. Specifications of the Malawi prototype model 
 
The Malawi prototype model differs from the above-described analytical model in two ways, one 
simplifying the model, the other complicating it. First, due to lack of data, certain assumptions about 
missing parameters were made. We assumed the subsistence quantities in the linear expenditure system to 
be zero, and the substitution parameter of the production functions to be one in the limit. Both these 
assumptions are tantamount to assuming a Cobb-Douglas functional form, which is a special case of the 
more general forms we introduced.  
 
Second, we specify six distinct household groups with household-specific activities, instead of the single 
representative household depicted in the theoretical model. The six household groups include both rural 
and urban households and thus represent the whole economy. The purpose of distinguishing between 
household groups is to capture heterogeneity in the constraints households face, which are likely to affect 
their response to external shocks. It is important, however, to rely on exogenous constraints while defining 
the household groups. This is of particular importance in the DEVPEM, which treats household market 
participation as an endogenous outcome, such that any information on sales or purchases has to be ignored 
when defining household groups. We define these household groups based on land ownership and 
remoteness to markets.  
 
Land ownership, which is assumed to be fixed (exogenous) in the short run, is used as the main indicator to 
define the household categories. These differences in land ownership are assumed to capture differences in 
production technology, and it is well-established that land ownership is strongly correlated with market 
participation (Barrett and Dorosh, 1996). We distinguish between landless households and small, medium, 
and large landowners. 
 
We also assume that households differ in the extent to which they face transaction costs in markets for 
goods and factors of production. Given that transaction costs are a function of distance to markets and that 
households are unable to relocate in the short run, these are also exogenous to the household. We define 
households as remote if they are above a certain threshold on a “remoteness scale”.
5 To limit the number of 
                                                      
5 The Integrated Household Survey features several distance variables for each surveyed community. We selected 
twelve distance variables, and classified the communities into distance quintiles (5 being most remote) for each 
  14 household groups, we assume that remoteness for medium-sized and large farmers have smaller effects on 
market participation than for small farmers and only make the remote/non-remote distinction for small 
farmers. The magnitude of transactions costs was estimated using the price section of the LSMS data, 
using the prices of select goods and services.
6 It was found that, on average, remote households pay 18.5% 
higher prices than members of the other household groups.  
 
Table 2 summarizes the household groups. Non-agricultural households are outside the agricultural sector 
in the sense that they do not engage in crop or livestock production or in agricultural employment. These 
are a diverse group of households, including skilled and unskilled households, the majority (75%) residing 
in urban areas. The second group consists of households that report being landless yet engaged in 
agriculture – either by cultivating crops or by participating in the agricultural labour market. Their share of 
income originating from farming is relatively low (30%), and their primary income source is off-farm 
wage labour. Farm households are categorized as follows: small farmers own less than 1 hectare of land, 
medium-sized own 1–3 hectares, and large farmers own more than 3 hectares. 
 
The share of household income derived from farm activities increases with land ownership. This pattern, 
also found in other developing countries, may reflect economies of scale and the related fact that farming is 
an insufficient income source for many small farmers, who therefore must rely on off-farm income sources 
to secure their livelihood. A higher farm income share in remote than non-remote small farmer households 




Table 2: Definition and sample sizes of household groups in the Malawi model 







1. non-agricultural   Does not cultivate  769  0%  54,854 
2. landless agric.  Does not own land, but cultivates or is engaged in 
agricultural employment 
1021 30% 55,331 
3. small, non-
remote 
Owns < 1 ha of land; ≤ 3.5 on remoteness scale  3711  57%  34,727 
4. small, remote  Owns < 1 ha of land; > 3.5 on remoteness scale  1063  72%  30,139 
5. medium  Owns 1-5 ha of land  4183  73%  44,454 
6.large  Owns > 5 ha of land  475  80%  58,428 
Note: Average income is based on an annual household income (MWK) estimated by RIGA (Carletto, et al., 2007), 
with consumption of own farm production valued at consumer prices. 100 MWK is approximately 1 USD. 
 
 
There are seven goods defined for the Malawi model: maize, rice, other food crops, tobacco, tree crops, 
livestock products, and a “market good” that cannot be produced on the farm. Maize and rice are treated 
separately from other food crops, inasmuch as they are the largest grain crops in terms of production 
volume (FAOSTAT) and are often the targets of agricultural and trade policies.  The “other” category is 
primarily composed of tubers (potatoes and cassava), pulses, and other cereals (millet, sorghum). Tobacco 
                                                                                                                                                                             
distance. We then defined as “remote” the communities whose “mean distance quintile” across the twelve distances 
was above 3.5. The twelve variables were the distances to nearest: asphalt road, bus stop, urban center, local 
government, daily market, weekly market, post office, telephone, bank, clinic, primary school and secondary school.  
6 We selected goods and services that are not produced by the rural sector and are unlikely to be subsidized or given 
away for free by NGO’s. The list includes batteries, cigarettes, beer, detergent, cloth, toothbrushes, and the price of 
transportation to the nearest local government. 
  15 constitutes the annual cash crop and tree crops the permanent cash crops (such as fruits, coffee etc.). The 
production of each farm good involves labour, physical capital, land, and intermediate inputs (such as 
seeds and fertilizer).  
 
Further details on how the variables in the Malawi model were defined, how the data were obtained, 
and how the model was calibrated are presented in Annex 2. 
 
4.3. Simulation of policy changes 
To illustrate the potential insights that DEVPEM can provide into differentiated policy impacts within the 
rural economy, the Malawi model was used to simulate the impacts of three sets of policy shocks:  
• A 10% change in price of each major food and cash crop; 
• A 10% input subsidy, reflected in a lower price paid by the farmer for purchased inputs; 
• The elimination of transaction costs. 
In the case of the first two experiments, the price changes are introduced exogenously, and no account is 
taken of the possible need to pay for these policies from domestic resources. 
Table 3 reports the findings from these simulations. For the crop price changes, the table presents for each 
household the marketed surplus prior to the policy shock (a useful reference when interpreting the effects 
of each shock), the effect on nominal income, and the effect on welfare. All of these effects reflect 
interactions among the diverse household groups within the rural economy. The welfare effect was 
calculated as the (negative of the) income transfer that would be required to maintain each household group 
at its welfare level prior to the policy change. This transfer, akin to a compensating variation (see 
Taylor et al. (2009)), is expressed as a percentage of each household group’s base income. The table also 
presents a relative transfer efficiency estimate, which compares the efficiency of alternative policies in 
terms of generating welfare gains for rural households. It was calculated as the total welfare effect (defined 
above) divided by the cost of the income transfer implied by each policy.
7 
The first data column in the table presents the total or aggregate effect of each policy on rural households’ 
income and welfare. Rather than the sum of effects across all household groups, this column was computed 
using a “reduced” version of the model with a single representative household and no transactions costs. 
This column should thus be read as a more “naive” estimation which ignores the diversity of the rural 
sector in Malawi. It does, however, consider both the production and consumption aspects of the household 
economy: it should thus be emphasized that even such aggregate household results are not available from a 
PEM-type model, in which firms, not households, are the key actors. Columns 2(a-f) report results 
separately for each of the six household groups. The last column in Table 3 presents the transfer efficiency 
estimates. 
Policy simulation 1: market price support 
                                                      
7 It does not, therefore, include the administrative costs associated with financing (e.g., tax collection) or 
implementing each policy. 
  16 The market price support (MPS) experiments simulate, in turn, the rural economy-wide effects of a 10% 
increase in the price of maize, rice, other staples, tobacco, tree crops, and livestock. In the aggregate, there 
is striking variation in the nominal income and welfare effects of these policies (Column 1). All nominal 
income effects are positive; however, they vary from 0.3% (rice) to 6.3% (other food) of household base 
income. The largest effects are for maize and other food crops. They are the only crops for which the 
impact exceeds 1% of base income. The welfare effects vary in both magnitude and sign, because they take 
into account the welfare cost of higher consumption prices, which may outweigh the positive effect of 
higher nominal income. The welfare effect of an agricultural price increase never exceeds the nominal 
income effect. The two effects are the same only for goods that rural households produce but do not 
consume. This effectively is the case for tobacco
8. The divergence between nominal income and welfare 
effects is greatest for staples, which constitute a significant share of rural household budgets. For example, 
the maize MPS raises total nominal income by 1.7% but welfare by only 0.4%, and the MPS for other 
staples raises nominal income and welfare by 6.3% and 3.9%, respectively. 
These aggregate results mask the impacts of MPS on individual household groups. In general, one would 
expect that large marketed-surplus producers will benefit most from MPS for their crop. Households that 
do not produce the crop and are pure consumers will lose when the market price of the crop increases. This 
pattern is evident when one compares columns 2(a-f) in Table 3. With only one exception, large and 
medium commercial farm households benefit from MPS in terms of both nominal income and welfare. 
With few exceptions, these households also enjoy the largest percentage increases in nominal income and 
welfare. For example, the 10% MPS for maize raises nominal income and welfare of large commercial 
farm households by 2.6% and 1.9%, respectively. However, it decreases the welfare of non-farm rural 
households (-1.8%), small farm households (-0.2%), and remote farm households (-0.7%). The MPS for 
other staples raises welfare by 5.8% on large commercial farms, 2.5% on small commercial farms, and 
1.3% in landless agricultural households. Welfare on non-farm rural households decreases by 3.4%. A 
MPS for livestock produces a similar pattern, although the impacts tend to be smaller. They range from 
0.3% in large commercial farm households to -0.9% in landless agricultural households and -2.4% in non-
farm rural households. 
                                                      
8 Cigarettes and cigars are industrial products and their purchase enters the model in the category “market good”. 
Smoking cannot be assimilated to consumption of a self-produced good, as the profits from transformation have 
leaked out of the rural sector. 
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Table 3: Policy simulation results from the Malawi DEVPEM  






































Marketed Surplus for maize  4551  -1006 -70  -1215  -925  5679  2180 
Effect on nominal income (%)  1.7%  0  1.9% 1.4%  0.9% 2.0% 2.6% 
10% increase in price 
of maize 
Effect on Welfare (% of income)  0.4%  -1.8%  0.3% -0.2%  -0.7% 0.9% 1.9% 
2791  0.25 
Marketed Surplus for rice  -283  -645 -607  -148  386  776  -10 
Effect on nominal income (%)  0.3%  0  0.2% 0.3%  0.6% 0.3% 0.1% 
10% increase in price 
of rice 
Effect on Welfare (% of income)  0.007%  -1.2%  -0.4% 0.01%  0.4%  0.1% -0.02% 
454  0.03 
Marketed Surplus for staples  55232  -1866 -543  7203  3533  40079  7147 
Effect on nominal income (%)  6.3%  0  4.3% 5.4%  6.3% 7.3% 7.6% 
10% increase in price 
of other staples 
Effect on Welfare (% of income)  3.9%  -3.4%  1.3% 2.5%  3.5% 5.3% 5.8% 
10130  0.59 
Marketed Surplus for tobacco  7629  0 76  1907  1762  3815  229 
Effect on nominal income (%)  0.6%  0  0.2% 0.6%  1.6% 0.5% 0.2% 
10% increase in price 
of tobacco 
Effect on Welfare (% of income)  0.6%  0  0.2% 0.6%  1.6% 0.5% 0.2% 
968  0.88 
Marketed Surplus for tree crops  9141  -509  -532 2497  1119 5154 1413 
Effect on nominal income (%)  1.3%  0  0.6% 1.6%  1.7% 1.3% 1.6% 
10% increase in price 
of tree crops 
Effect on Welfare (% of income)  0.7%  -0.9%  -0.2% 0.8%  1.2% 0.7% 1.2% 
2115  0.50 
Marketed Surplus for livestock  -1584  -1329 -1062  -953  11 1425 325 
Effect on nominal income (%)  0.8%  0  0.7% 0.7%  0.7% 0.9% 0.9% 
10% increase in price 
of livestock 
Effect on Welfare (% of income)  -0.004%  -2.4%  -0.9%  -0.1%  0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 
1287  0.001 
Effect on nominal income (%)  3.3%  0  2.4% 2.8%  3.2% 3.8% 4.2%  10% decrease in price 
of crop inputs  Effect on Welfare (% of income)  3.3%  0  2.4% 2.8%  3.2% 3.8% 4.2% 
5442  0.92 
Effect on nominal income (%)  0.4%  0  0.5% 0.5%  0.4% 0.4% 0.3%  10% decrease in price 
of livestock inputs  Effect on Welfare (% of income)  0.4%  0  0.5% 0.5%  0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 
751  0.86 
Effect on nominal income (%)  NA  0 0.07%  0.02%  7.8%  -0.02%  -0.02%  Removal of 
transactions costs  Effect on Welfare (% of income)  NA  0 0.07%  0.02%  5.8%  -0.02%  -0.02% 
NA  NA   19 
Policy simulation 2: an input subsidy 
Our input subsidy simulations explore the effects of a 10% decrease in the price of intermediate inputs. 
Input mixes differ between agricultural and livestock production; thus, separate simulations were 
performed for these two activities. The agricultural input subsidy experiment is of particular interest in 
light of Malawi’s recent fertilizer subsidy policies. An important feature of input subsidies is that they do 
not produce negative welfare effects via higher consumption costs. Because of this, the percentage changes 
in nominal income and welfare are the same in input subsidy simulations. 
The 10% crop input subsidy raises nominal income and welfare by 3.3%. This is higher than in any of the 
MPS experiments except for one (other staples). There is no effect on non-farm rural households, which do 
not produce crops and thus do not benefit from the input subsidy. The effects for all other household 
groups are positive, and they vary less than in the MPS experiments. Large holder commercial households 
benefit most (4.2%), but the range of effects in the other household groups is relatively small, from 2.4% to 
3.8%. All of these are smaller than in the MPS experiments with the exception of other staples. For 
agricultural producer households, the welfare effects of the input subsidy and other-staple MPS 
experiments are comparable; however, the subsidy does not have a negative consumption-cost effect on 
non-farm rural households. It can be argued, therefore, that the crop subsidy has the most favourable 
distributional effects of all of the policies considered in Table 3. An input subsidy for livestock produces 
positive, equally distributed, but small income and welfare effects, ranging from 0.3% to 0.5%.  
The relative efficiency of alternative instruments 
The size of each subsidy is calculated as 10% of the estimated value of the output (in the case of a MPS) or 
of intermediate inputs (in the case of the input subsidy). The relative transfer efficiency (TE) index offers a 
way to assess the efficiency of these subsidies in terms of generating welfare gains in rural households. An 
index greater than 1.0 would indicate that the subsidy increases rural household welfare by an amount 
greater than the subsidy, itself. An index of less than 1.0 implies that the welfare effect is smaller than the 
size of the subsidy. By this measure, the livestock, rice and maize MPS appear to be inefficient. The TE 
measure is 0.25 for maize, 0.03 for rice, and zero for livestock. The crop input subsidy, in contrast, has a 
TE of 0.92. It has the highest welfare effect of any of the subsidies considered. Two other policies, the 
livestock input subsidy and the tobacco MPS, also have high TEs (0.86 and 0.88, respectively). Their 
effects on rural household welfare are small compared to the effect of the crop input subsidy, however. 
Policy simulation 3: eliminating transaction costs 
High transaction costs are a quintessential feature of poor rural economies, particularly for remote farm 
households. The DEVPEM was designed to explore the ramifications of high transaction costs that create 
an “output price band” for some household groups. Within this band, a household-specific shadow price 
replaces the exogenously determined market price as a basis for production and consumption decisions and 
the household does not participate in the market, producing only for subsistence. The removal of 
transaction costs (e.g., via the development of marketing infrastructure) directly benefits the remote 
household group. Its nominal income rises by 7.8% and its welfare by 5.8%. Indirectly, removing 
transaction costs for the remote group affects other groups by way of their interactions in rural markets, 
particularly for factors. These indirect effects are positive but small, however, ranging from a .02% loss for 
large commercial households to a 0.07% gain for the landless agricultural households. These simulation 
results suggest that reducing transaction costs can create significant benefits for remote households without 
adversely affecting others in the rural economy. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of transaction costs on the marketed surplus produced by agricultural 
households in remote areas. When the market price of maize is sufficiently low (in the figure, less than approximately 1.7 times the initial or base price of maize), the household participates in the market as a net 
buyer, despite facing high transaction costs. When the market price is sufficiently high to overcome 
transaction costs on the producer side, the household participates in the market as a net seller. In between, 
the household’s marketed surplus is zero. Over this subsistence interval, the market price has little effect 




The removal of transaction costs (e.g., via the development of marketing infrastructure) directly benefits 
the remote household group. Its nominal income rises by 7.8% and its welfare by 5.8%. Indirectly, 
removing transaction costs for the remote group affects other groups by way of their interactions in rural 
markets, particularly for factors. These indirect effects are positive but small, however, ranging from a 
.02% loss for large commercial households to a 0.07% gain for the landless agricultural households. These 
simulation results suggest that reducing transaction costs can create significant benefits for remote 
households without adversely affecting others in the rural economy. 
 




Figure 4: Decision prices of remote and market-integrated agricultural households 
 
  20 5. Conclusions and next steps 
DEVPEM is being developed as a companion to the OECD-country PEM as a tool for policy 
evaluation in developing countries, in which agricultural production is carried out by heterogeneous 
households and where market transaction costs potentially play an important role in shaping policy 
impacts. The models are similar in that they depict the impacts of agricultural policies on incomes over the 
short to medium term. However, there are important differences between the two models. In structural 
terms, one might view the PEM as being effectively a special case of DEVPEM, in which production is 
carried out not by households but, rather, by a single aggregate or representative firm, and in which 
transaction costs are negligible. 
The modelling work for this project is still at the development stage, but the preliminary results for 
Malawi indicate that agricultural policies may have fundamentally different impacts on incomes in low 
income countries to those obtained in developed OECD countries. As in OECD countries, market price 
support is likely to be an ineffective instrument for raising the incomes of farm households, albeit for 
different reasons. In the PEM, market price support is ineffective because a significant share of the benefits 
“leaks” to non-farm factor owners (input suppliers and land owners). In the DEVPEM prototype for 
Malawi, market price support is similarly ineffective, not because of these leakages (farm households 
supply relatively more of their own inputs to production) but because farm households consume a 
significant share of what they produce. Indeed, net food deficit farm households could lose from higher 
food prices, if their production response is sufficiently limited. In the case of input subsidies, there are a 
priori reasons for believing that such measures could have a superior transfer efficiency to those obtained 
in OECD countries, again because farmers tend mostly to supply their own factors to the farm operation, so 
there less scope for leakages to other agents. Of course, high transfer efficiency is not by itself enough to 
justify the use of input subsidies. As discussed in Part I, a range of factors need to be considered, beyond 
an instrument’s immediate impact on short term incomes. Nevertheless, the possibility that a large share of 
the benefits of input subsidies could be retained by the farm household is significant to that broader 
discussion. Finally, the prototype model suggests that policies to reduce transaction costs can have 
important benefits for households whose market interactions are impeded by those costs. 
In the near future, we plan to extend the modelling work in two directions. In the first place there is a 
need to refine the prototype model by considering a number of factors that were discussed at the PEM 
expert meeting in September, and were considered to be potentially important. For example, it was 
considered important to address the possibility that food prices are determined endogenously in the rural 
economy. Another issue raised was that seasonal cash constraints may affect farmers’ responses to changes 
in market prices. Aside from developing the model structure to accommodate such possibilities, it will also 
be important to provide a more detailed interpretation of the results, including a mapping onto measures of 
poverty, inequality and food security. Further consideration will also be given to the manner in which 
policies are implemented and how they are financed, as well as a wider range of policy experiments. Once 
the prototype model is fully developed, a series of country models will be constructed, as noted in 
Section 4, with a view to describing how structural differences between developing countries can affect the 
distribution of policy impacts.     
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  22  Annex 1. Solution of the model 
 
To solve for the first order conditions of the model, we first define the Lagrangian of the joint utility and 
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These first order conditions lead to a solvable system of equations, which we derive below. We first need 
to define the notion of shadow price (until now absent from the model) and spell out the constraints on 
decision-making prices. Let us define 
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  23 which we will call the household shadow price of good i. This then lets us re-write equations (30) and (31) 
as: 
 



























We then turn to the consumption side of the household economy. Using the definition of shadow prices 
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which, when multiplied by pi and summed over i, yields: 
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where y can be interpreted as the shadow income of the household, that is, the shadow value (in money 
units) of household consumption (whether bought on the market or self-provided).
9 We will later show that 
it is also equal to the shadow value of the household’s assets. This definition of y also allows us to write 
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Having defined consumption demands, we now turn to the production side of the household economy. We 
first derive the optimal use of factors in production functions. Rather than explicitly writing out factor 
demands, it is common practice when using constant elasticity functional forms to work with relative 
factor ratios. Using equation (28) for two different factors k and l used in the production of good i we can 
write the optimality condition in terms of factor ratios in the production of good i:  
 
9 The Lagrangian multiplier on the full-income constraint, λ, might be viewed as an exchange rate converting income 
currency (e.g., dollars) into welfare currency (utils). Dividing U by λ thus converts utility into the income currency, 
i.e., into what we call the shadow income. This shadow income is identical to full income when the prices of all goods 
are exogenous to the household. A similar approach appears in Holden et al.(1999). 
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and is excluded from this condition, since we have not defined the notion of price for land, for which 
 
L
there is no market. To derive an equivalent factor ratio condition for optimal land use, let us take a closer 
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he left-hand term is the marginal value product of land in the production of good i, in other words the “shadow 
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his definition allows us to write an optimality condition for land use similar to equation (41), obtained in 
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here the second equality follows from dividing by λ and using the optimality condition (42). The 
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ote that if this equation is true for all goods i and all factors k, the condition in equation (41) is rendered 
his would complete the description of the production side of the economy if there was a perfectly elastic 
N
redundant, because it follows directly from this one: By writing equation (45) for factors k and l then 
dividing one by the other, we obtain equation (41).  
 
T
supply of all factors in our model. Land use, however, is constrained on the supply side by the CET land 
supply function. Using equation (29) for the use of the land factor in the production of two different goods 
i and j, we can write an optimality condition for the ratio of different land uses:  
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The final step tying the production and consumption sides together is to derive the “shadow income” 
equation. Let us use equation (33) multiplied by pi and summed over i. Equation (32) allows simplifying 
the quantities bought and sold away to obtain:  
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But from equation (41), which we multiply by pi and sum over j and i, and from the fact that the beta 
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p Ey = ∑   (50) 
 
Equation (50) defines the “shadow income” of the household as the value of all endowments evaluated at 
shadow prices.  
 
We have thus completed the derivation of the system of equations fully describing the solution to our 
model. The complete set of first order conditions is summarized in Table A1. 
  26 Table A1: DEVPEM variables and equations 
Sets and parameters  Variables  Number of variables 
    
Sets   Qi quantities produced  N–1 
i (=k), N goods and factors  f
ik Q  input of k into production of i.  N(N–1) 
Parameters  , 
s b
i QQ i  quantities sold or bought  2N–2 
m
i p market prices, i≠T  Ci quantities consumed  N–1 
s
i t  additive sales transaction cost  pi shadow price, i≠T   N–1 
b
i t additive purchase transaction cost  riT shadow rent   N–1 
Ei initial endowments (fixed in the case of land)  y shadow income  1 
     
Function parameters  Total number of variables:  (5 + N)N–5 
αi exponent in consumption function     
βi exponent in production function     
γi CET share parameters     
ρ CET exponent     
      
Equations Domain  restrictions  Number of equations  Description 
























i≠T  2N–2   Price bands  
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Total number of equations:     (5+N)N–5   
 
  27 Annex 2. Data sources and construction of variables for the Malawi prototype model 
 
This Annex briefly explains how the variables used in the Malawi simulations were defined. The two data 
sources are the 2004 Malawi Integrated Household Survey, processed by the RIGA team at FAO and 
FAOSTAT. The former data set is referred to below as “RIGA data”. 
 
To obtain the information needed in the SAM described in Table 1, we needed to define a) adequate 
household groups, b) product categories, c) value of production, d) consumption, e) expenditure on input in 
production, and f) household income by source. FAOSTAT was used to obtain information on total value 
of production and consumption of each good category. The RIGA data were used to obtain all other 
information. The construction of each of these components is described below.  
 
a) Household groups 
 
As described in section 4, six household groups were defined, based on land ownership, production, and 
remoteness to markets. Category 1 does not cultivate, yet households in this category may own land. 
Category 2 does not own land but is engaged in cultivation either by renting land or by working on a farm. 
Category 3 and 4 (small landowners) both have less than 1 hectare of land. The difference between the two 
is their “remoteness” to markets. We defined a remoteness indicator based on 12 community variables in 
the Malawi survey (see footnote 6). For each variable, communities were divided into quintiles, with the 5
th 
quintile containing the most “remote” communities. A community was defined as remote if its “average 
quintile” was above 3.5. Thus, households in category 4 all reside in communities defined as remote. 
Households in category 5 (medium land owners) own more than 1 but less than 5 hectares of land, and 
large land owners own 5 hectares or more. 
 
b) Product categories  
 
Agricultural goods were defined to fit four types of land use: Food crops, annual cash crops, tree crops, and 
livestock products. Among food crops, we distinguish between maize (local maize, composite maize, and 
hybrid maize), rice, and other crops (all other food crops listed in rain-fed and dry-season cultivation in the 
agricultural modules of the survey). Annual cash crops are tobacco in the case of Malawi, and tree crops 
consist of all crops in the tree crop production module of the survey, including fruits, tea, and coffee. The 
livestock product category includes all meat, dairy products, and all other livestock by-products. 
 
c) Value of production 
 
The total value of production of each product category was obtained from data on quantity and producer 
prices from FAOSTAT. To distribute the aggregate production value among the household groups, we 
used production shares derived from the RIGA data (Table A2). These shares were then multiplied by the 
aggregate FAOSTAT production value to assign total value of production for each household group. 
 
d) Value of consumption 
 
The value of consumption of each product category for each household group was estimated analogously 
to the production values. Using FAOSTAT, we multiplied consumption in tonnes by producer prices to get 
total consumption value of each good. Consumption shares per household group were estimated based on 
consumption information in the RIGA data (Table A1).  
 









remote  5. medium  6. large  Total 
Production shares          
Maize  0.00 0.06 0.19 0.03 0.55 0.17  1.00 
Rice  0.00 0.01 0.24 0.12 0.57 0.05  1.00 
Other food crops  0.00 0.03 0.17 0.06 0.53 0.21  1.00 
Tobacco  0.00 0.01 0.25 0.21 0.50 0.03  1.00 
Tree crops  0.00 0.01 0.22 0.19 0.47 0.11  1.00 
Livestock  0.00 0.06 0.22 0.07 0.55 0.10  1.00 
          
Consumption 
shares          
Maize  0.05 0.09 0.31 0.10 0.41 0.04  1.00 
Rice  0.16 0.16 0.27 0.05 0.33 0.03  1.00 
Other food crops  0.05 0.09 0.31 0.08 0.41 0.06  1.00 
Tobacco  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 
Tree crops  0.05 0.09 0.34 0.07 0.40 0.05  1.00 
Livestock  0.11 0.14 0.27 0.06 0.37 0.06  1.00 
           
 
 
e) Value of inputs in production 
 
The biggest challenge in deriving variables for the SAM was to estimate the cost of each factor used in 
farm production, for each product and each household category. We defined five inputs – own labour, 
physical capital, land, hired labour, and intermediate inputs. We treated the first three as household 
endowments, which means that utilization of any of these factors is an implicit cost to the household. Hired 
labour and purchases of intermediate inputs (seeds and fertilizer), on the other hand, are explicit costs. 
There is some information available in the RIGA data on explicit costs, but all implicit costs needed to be 
estimated. We assume zero economic profit in production of each good, such that, 
 
TRi = TCi = TICi + TECi, 
 
where TRi denotes total revenue in production of good i, and TC denotes total costs, as the sum of implicit 
costs (TIC) and explicit costs (TEC). This means that the net revenue (total revenue minus explicit costs) is 
equal to implicit costs. To derive implicit cost shares for own labour, capital, and land, we used the 
following identity: 
 
TIC = rLQL + rKQK + rTQT, 
 
where QL, QK, and QT denote quantities of own labour, capital, and land, respectively, and rL, rK, and rT 
denote the respective shadow prices. Own labour’s cost share, then, is  
 
sL = rLQL / TR,  
 
with capital’s and land’s cost shares, sK and sT, defined analogously. While the shadow prices are 
unobserved, we have some information in the RIGA data on net revenue (and hence TIC), and the 
quantities of each factor endowment, QL, QK, and QT. We estimated the following linear regression through 
the origin to obtain shadow price estimates: 
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TIC = bLQL + bKQK + bTQT + e 
 
where the b’s denote coefficients to be estimated and e denotes the error term. This regression was 
estimated for each product category and for each household group. Information on input utilization, 
however, is not available on crop level in the RIGA data. We therefore used single-crop farmers as the 
sample for each crop-specific regression, with the assumption that multi-cropping farms use the same 
production technology mono-croppers. 
 
The estimated cost shares for labour, capital, and land in crop production were defined as: 
 





  ˆ ˆ /( / KK K sb Q T I C T I C T R =×  
 
ˆˆ ˆ (1 ) ( / ) TL K ss s T I C T =−− ×  
 
where “hats” indicate estimates. 
 
Cost shares for hired labour (HL) and intermediate inputs (IN) were defined as: 
 




sIN = 1 – sL – sK – sT – sHL. 
 
For livestock production, we only assumed three inputs: capital, land and one variable input. The cost share 
of the land and capital inputs (implicit cost share) was defined as the ratio of net revenue to total revenue. 
For lack of better information, the cost shares of land and capital were assumed to be equal. The cost share 
of the variable inputs was defined as the residual share. Table A3 gives an overview of these cost shares. 
 
 
f) Household income 
 
In order to derive an estimate of aggregate household income for each household group that is comparable 
with the production and consumption values derived from FAOSTAT, we used the following relationship: 
 
Total household income = agprodFAOSTAT * (agnet/ aggross)RIGA * (1 / agshareRIGA), 
 
where  agprod is the value of the household group’s total agricultural production derived from to 
FAOSTAT, (agnet/aggross) is the average ratio of net to gross agricultural incomes according to RIGA 
data and agshare is the share of agricultural income in total household income according to RIGA data. 
Subscripts were added to indicate data source. 
 
To estimate the value of consumption of non-farm products (“market goods”), we assumed that total 
household income equals total household expenditure and that non-farm consumption is the difference 
between household income and agricultural consumption. Table A4 shows shares of income spent on each 
good for each household group.  









remote  5. medium  6. large 
Maize        
Own  labour  0.14 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.18 
Physical  capital 0.44 0.32 0.15 0.40 0.03 0.31 
Land  0.07 0.29 0.52 0.43 0.50 0.11 
Hired  labour  0.09 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.11 0.11 
Intermediate  inputs  0.26 0.28 0.26 0.11 0.30 0.28 
Rice        
Own  labour  0.37 0.37 0.38 0.28 0.23 0.30 
Physical  capital 0.41 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.47 
Land  0.03 0.38 0.37 0.44 0.46 0.02 
Hired  labour  0.06 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 
Intermediate  inputs  0.13 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.17 0.17 
Other food crops        
Own  labour  0.24 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.18 0.22 
Physical  capital 0.31 0.21 0.21 0.06 0.09 0.31 
Land  0.05 0.27 0.27 0.57 0.34 0.07 
Hired  labour  0.07 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04 
Intermediate  inputs  0.33 0.35 0.35 0.25 0.32 0.36 
Tobacco        
Own  labour  0.17 0.11 0.15 0.06 0.06 0.13 
Physical  capital 0.27 0.20 0.10 0.20 0.20 0.26 
Land  0.09 0.24 0.31 0.26 0.26 0.12 
Hired  labour  0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Intermediate  inputs  0.43 0.41 0.40 0.42 0.42 0.44 
Tree crops        
Own  labour  0.12 0.06 0.16 0.20 0.12 0.16 
Physical  capital 0.49 0.34 0.21 0.31 0.03 0.42 
Land  0.02 0.32 0.51 0.13 0.43 0.02 
Hired  labour  0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.07 
Intermediate  inputs  0.33 0.26 0.10 0.34 0.36 0.33 
Livestock         
Capital  0.20  0.135 0.175 0.215 0.255 0.335 
Land  0.20  0.135 0.175 0.215 0.255 0.335 
Intermediate  inputs  0.60 0.73 0.65 0.57 0.49 0.33 













remote  5. medium  6. large 
Expenditure shares        
Maize  ..  0.14 0.15 0.15 0.09 0.03 
Rice ..  0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.00 
Other food crops  ..  0.26 0.28 0.22 0.16 0.08 
Tobacco ..  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Tree crops  ..  0.07 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.02 
Livestock ..  0.13 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.03 
Non-farm goods  ..  0.34 0.37 0.52 0.64 0.84 
Total   ..  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
         
  31   32 
Table A5: DEVPEM data requirements 
Variable category  Information needed  Purpose  Source 
1. Household types  Land ownership, household 
education, and/or remoteness to 
markets  
“Exogenous” (fixed) household 
characteristics that can distinguish between 
4-6 household groups and capture 
heterogeneity in responses to shocks. 
RIGA 
2. Value of total 
production 
National production of: 
a) the two or three most important 
food crops 
b) residual food crops 
c) annual cash crops (e.g. tobacco 
or entire group of crops) 
d) permanent cash crops (tree 
crops) 
e) livestock products 
National aggregate production information 
is used to estimate each household group’s 
total production of each crop. The product 
categories are defined to capture different 
types of land use. 
FAOSTAT 
3. Value of total 
consumption  
National consumption of items 
(a) – (e) 
To estimate each household group’s total 





The share of each household 
group’s production of each 
product defined above 
Multiplied by national production of each 
good, these will provide the value of 






The share of each household 
group’s consumption of each 
product defined above 
Multiplied by national consumption of each 
good, these will provide the value of 
consumption of each good, for each 
household category. 
RIGA 
6. Input cost shares   For each product defined, explicit 




d) intermediate inputs (e.g. seeds 
and fertilizer) 
Assuming zero economic profits, the cost 
shares provide costs of each input when 
multiplied by total agricultural gross 
revenue. Implicit costs are unobserved and 
need to be estimated with regression 
analysis based on input quantities or on 
some other method. (Number of inputs may 





Share of total income for: 
a) net and gross farm production 
b) agricultural wage income 
c) non-agricultural income 
 
Given the information on total agricultural 
production, an estimate of total household 
income can be derived that is consistent 
with the consumption and production values 
defined above. Non-farm income is then 
estimated using the corresponding income 
share. Assuming zero saving, total income 
equals total consumption. Consumption of 
market (non-farm) goods is given by the 
difference between estimated total income 
and total consumption on agricultural 
goods. If relevant, additional income 
sources may be defined (e.g. migrant 
remittances). 
RIGA 
 
 
 